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1. Introduction
Almost all studies of planned obsolescence have analyzed two-period games
played by a monopolist and the consumers of its product (see a survey by
Waldman (2003) and references therein; Fishman and Rob (2000, 2002) are
the exceptions.1). This paper studies product renewal related to planned ob-
solescence in a simple inﬁnite-horizon game played by duopolists and derives
welfare implications from the equilibrium paths.
In the monopoly case, a market for old products plays an essential role
in product renewal because introducing new products lowers the value of
old products by making them obsolete. In a two-period model of durable
goods, Waldman (1996) showed that, even under this “obsolescence eﬀect,”
a monopolist has a strong incentive to introduce a new product in the second
period as well as in the ﬁrst period even though it can gain more proﬁt by
introducing a product only in the ﬁrst period.2
In the duopoly case, introducing new products also makes “rival’s” old
products obsolete. Under this “business-stealing eﬀect,” a possible outcome
in the inﬁnite-horizon would be that no ﬁrm will make its product renewal
simultaneously with the rival ﬁrm. Even if a rival’s product introduction
makes a ﬁrm’s product obsolete in a period, the ﬁrm can obtain more proﬁt
when it renews its product because the ﬁrm can also make its rival’s product
obsolete and the rival does not renew its product in the same period.
We show that this conjecture is true even in a simple setup (the basic
model). (I) Each duopolist eventually starts to make its product renewal at
the same interval but asynchronously with the other. (II) A turnover cycle
of their products’ quality levels appears.3 The key is that duopolists decide
the timing of product renewal so that consumers best value their renewal.4
1They analyzed the monopolist’s problem in an inﬁnite-horizon game.
2By this problem, planned obsolescence is somewhat misleading usage of the term
because it is not optimal. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) is a related work.
3Also see Rob and Sekiguchi (2004). They deﬁned a turnover equilibrium in a repeated
game with imperfect monitoring.
4Simultaneous product renewal is possible before a time arrives, as is discussed later.
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Developing Waldman (1996)’s model, Utaka (2006) recently examined the
eﬀect of marketing on consumer welfare in the monopoly case. He showed
that the marketing expenditure for product renewal reduces “consumer sur-
plus” because a larger obsolescence eﬀect due to marketing can promote
replacement demand of consumers of old products.5
Our welfare analysis uses a diﬀerent approach. We deﬁne “quality-adjusted
price” (QAP) of a product simply as the price paid by consumers divided
by the quality level of the product (Fishman and Rob (2002).6) and use the
QAPs of products as the measure of consumer welfare. Consumer welfare im-
proves as QAPs decrease by the deﬁnition of QAP. For such a welfare analysis
with QAPs, our basic model requires an extension with price competition.
Product renewal requires a moderate amount of marketing expenditure.
The extended model exhibits the following results: (A) When consumers
are suﬃciently tolerant of the delay in product renewal, the duopolists will
eventually start to renew their products asynchronously at the same interval.
(Before starting the stationary product renewal, duopolists may renew their
products simultaneously.) (B) Conversely, when consumers are not tolerant
of the delay, only a ﬁrm with a high-quality product renews it. (C) The more
tolerant of the delay consumers are, the earlier duopolists will start to renew
their products at the interval that is best for them.
Consumers’ tolerance of the delay is deﬁned as follows: if an interval has
not yet passed without product renewal, consumers of a high quality product
will not depreciate the product due to their brand loyalty to the product.
Once such an interval passes by without product renewal, they punish the
ﬁrm for the delay.
The equilibrium paths of QAPs clarify the implications of results (A)
and (B) for consumer welfare. In the case of (A), the prices of duopolists’
products tend to decrease at the early stages where the quality diﬀerence
tends to be smaller, and they remain in restricted ranges due to a more
5Utaka (2000) considered monopolist’s proﬁtability in a similar model.
6See Trajtenberg (1990) for the exact deﬁnition.
3
competitive situation at later stages. The quality levels tend to improve over
time, so QAPs tend to decease. In the case of (B), the price of a high-quality
product increases as the quality diﬀerence becomes larger, and it is renewed
at the longest interval that consumers can tolerate. As a result, the QAPs of a
high-quality product never decrease as much as in the case of (A). The QAPs
of a low-quality product never decrease because the price can increase the
same as that of a high-quality product even though the low-quality product
is not renewed and the quality goes down to the minimum level.
Before proceeding to our analysis, we will brieﬂy mention two important
features of the models. First, we do not consider the quality levels of old
products, so we do not deal with the market for old products explicitly and
can therefore clarify the business-stealing eﬀect on the duopolists’ strategic
timing of product renewal. Second, this paper assumes that each duopolist
maximizes the limit of average proﬁts (limit of means criterion) instead of
maximizing the sum of discounted short-run proﬁts (discounting criterion).7
As the discount rate δ tends to one, we can ﬁnd the equilibria derived from
the discounting criterion corresponding to the one derived in this analysis.
We can hence obtain the same results shown in this paper by computing the
equilibria with a ﬁxed discount rate δ and then taking δ suﬃciently large.
By not taking these two steps, the use of the limit of means criterion enables
us to reach our results in only one step and facilitates the proofs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic model and
shows its results. Firms’ price decisions and consumers’ tolerance are not
considered here. Section 3 begins with an example of price competition and
extends the basic model with price competition and consumers’ tolerance and
provides its welfare implications. The proofs of the results from this section
are shown in the Appendix. Section 4 discusses real practices, other related
works and empirical regularities of QAPs. The periodic and asynchronous
full-model changes in the Japanese automobile industry are also depicted.
7See chapter 8 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for a comparison of these two criteria.
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2. The Basic Model
The analysis begins with the simplest possible model that generates the
duopolists’ asynchronous periodic product renewal. We do not consider price
competition between duopolists and consumers’ tolerance of the delay in
product renewal. The model also does not include investment in research
and development (R&D) for new products. Interpret this situation as “model
changes” of products like automobiles, mobile phones and so on. To clarify
the business-stealing eﬀect on the strategic timing of product renewal, we do
not explicitly consider the quality of old products and their markets.
2.1 Repeated product renewal
There are two ﬁrms, α and β. At each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, each ﬁrm
i ∈ {α, β} decides whether to renew its product (si(t) = 1) or not (si(t) = 0).
The product renewal requires marketing expenditure C(> 0). Firm i pays
nothing when si(t) = 0. Let si = {si(t)}∞t=1. Let tk(si) denote the time at
which the k-th product renewal is made in si. Denote by xi(t) the quality
level of ﬁrm i’s product at time t. The initial quality level is xi(0), where
|xα(0)− xβ(0)| < ∞. For notational convenience, let t0(si) = 0.
Consumers depreciate old products and value new ones. Given si and
xi(0) = xi(t0(si)), the quality level xi(t) of ﬁrm i’s latest product at time
t ∈ [tk−1(si), tk(si)] (k ≥ 1) is valued in total by consumers as
xi(t) = λ
t−tk−1(si)xi(tk−1(si)) + a(t− tik−1(si))si(t),
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of quality, and a(·) ∈ [0,∞) is the
acceleration in quality. The latest product is valued as xi(tt−1(si)) when it is
introduced at tk−1(si), but consumers depreciate the product as it ages. This
is the ﬁrst term. The quality level of ﬁrm i’s product is boosted only when
si(t) = 1, and the acceleration a(·) depends on the interval τ = t − tk−1(si)
(k ≥ 1) that passes by without product renewal. This is the meaning of the
second term. For notational convenience, let a(0) = 0.
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There is a unique interval γmax ∈ (1,∞) such that in the period between
tk−1(si) and tk−1(si) + γmax (for any k ≥ 1), consumers best value product
renewal made only once at t = tk−1(si) + γmax. More precisely, divide γmax
into L shorter ones, and denote them by τ1, . . . , τL, i.e. 1 < L ≤ γmax and
τ1 + · · · + τL = γmax. Let product renewal be made at intervals τ1, . . . , τL.
Given the depreciation rate λ, assume for any L ∈ (1, γmax] and for any
sequence {τl}Ll=1 = {τ1, . . . , τL} of intervals,
a(γmax) >
L−1∑
l=1
λτl+1+···+τLa(τl) + a(τL). (1)
For example, when L = 3 and t3(si)−t0(si) = τ1+τ2+τ3 = γmax, xi(t3(si)) =
λτ1+τ2+τ3xi(0)+λ
τ3+τ2a(τ1)+λ
τ3a(τ2)+a(τ3) by the deﬁnition of xi(t). Then,
Eq. (1) implies that λγmaxxi(0) + a(γmax) > xi(t3(si)).
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The history induced by s = (sα, sβ) up to time t is described by
h(s, t) = ((sα(1), sβ(1)); . . . ; (sα(t− 1), sβ(t− 1))).
Let σi denote a function that assigns an action si(t) to h(s, t), which is called
ﬁrm i’s pure strategy. Let Σi be the set of all strategy of player i.
Given h(s, t) and s(t) = (sα(t), sβ(t)), ﬁrm i earns at time t its (gross)
short-run proﬁt due to both the latest and old products (although we do not
consider the quality levels of old products)
πti(s(t) : h(s, t)) =
{
πH if xi(t) > xj(t)
πL if xi(t) < xj(t),
(2)
where j = i. In case of a tie (xi(t) = xj(t)), ﬁrm i obtains πL when xi(t−1) <
xj(t− 1). We say that ﬁrm i is in a high (low) position at time t if it obtains
πH (πL) at time t. We say that “turnover” takes place when the positions of
ﬁrms are reversed.
8By this assumption, it would not be unnatural to assume that the quality levels evolve
over time with an ascending trend as long as ﬁrm i always makes its product renewal at
the interval γmax, i.e., λγmaxxi(tk−1(si)) + a(γmax) > xi(tk−1(si)) for any k ≥ 1.
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Deﬁne the long-run average net proﬁt of ﬁrm i by
Πi(σα, σβ) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
t=1{πti(s(t) : h(s, t))− si(t)C}
n
, (3)
where, for a given sequence {yn}n≥1, lim infn→∞ yn = supn≥1 infk≥n yk. A list
σ∗ = (σ∗α, σ
∗
β) of strategies is an equilibrium in pure strategies if
Πα(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) ≥ Πα(σα, σ∗β) for any σα ∈ Σα
Πβ(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) ≥ Πβ(σ∗α, σβ) for any σβ ∈ Σβ .
The mixed strategies and equilibria are deﬁned in the usual manner.
We could have assumed that each duopolist maximizes the sum of its
discounted short-run proﬁts. We can truly ﬁnd the equilibria derived from
the discounting criterion corresponding to the one in our analysis, as the
discount rate δ tends to one. As noted in Introduction, however, in order
to show our results under the discounting criterion, we need to compute the
equilibria with a ﬁxed discount rate δ and then take δ suﬃciently large. The
limit of means criterion enables us to reach the same results in only one step.
2.2 A turnover cycle
We here just mention the equilibria in mixed strategies.
Proposition. 1 The basic model has equilibria in mixed strategies.
Proof : See the Appendix.
Hereafter we conﬁne our attention to equilibria in pure strategies. We
assume that the marketing expenditure is so moderate that the ﬁrm in the
low position does not completely abandon renewing its products.
Assumption (a) πH − πL ≥ C.
Let µi(σ
∗) denote the average fraction of times that ﬁrm i is in the high
position in equilibrium σ∗ in the inﬁnite horizon. Let {{x∗i (t)}∞t=1, {x∗j (t)}∞t=1}
be a pair of quality ladders induced by an arbitrary equilibrium σ∗ in pure
strategies, if any.
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The following lemma implies that each duopolist has an opportunity to
be in the high position in equilibrium.
Lemma. 1 Suppose that the basic model has equilibria in pure strategies.
Under Assumption (a), for any equilibrium in pure strategies,
µi(σ
∗) := lim inf
n→∞
|{t ≤ n : x∗i (t) > x∗j(t)}|
n
> 0, i = α, β. (4)
Proof Suppose that there is an equilibrium σ∗ with µα(σ∗) = 0, w.l.o.g.
Then, in the equilibrium,
Πα(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
t=1{πL − s∗α(t)C}
n
,
Πβ(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
t=1{πH − s∗β(t)C}
n
. (5)
Let νn(0) (νn(1)) be the number of times with si(t) = 0 (si(t) = 1) taken
by ﬁrm i by the time t = n. Since each ﬁrm i chooses s∗i (t) at each time t
to maximize Πi(·, ·), s∗α(t) = s∗β(t) = 0 at almost every time t in the sense
that limn→∞ νn(1)/νn(0) = 0 (hereafter, we sometimes use the term “almost
every time” in this sense). This is true because each ﬁrm i must otherwise
pay a positive amount of average cost lim infn→∞
∑n
t=0 s
∗
i (t)C/n > 0 in the
long run. Thus, ﬁrm α obtains Πα(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = πL.
Consider the case where α deviates to a strategy σ′α such that s
′
α(t) = 1
if t − tk−1(s′α) = γmax for any k ≥ 1 and s′α(t) = 0 otherwise. Since β
takes s∗β(t) = 0 at almost every time t, there is a time n
′(< ∞) such that
α overtakes β at n′ and is in the high position almost anytime after n′,
and so α obtains Πα(σ
′
α, σ
∗
β) = πH − C/γmax. Since Assumption (a) implies
πH − C/γmax > πL, ﬁrm α has an incentive to take σ′α.
Let us conﬁrm that there is no equilibrium σ∗ with µα(σ∗) = 0. If it
exists, a possible case that leads to Eq. (5) with s∗α(t) = s
∗
β(t) = 0 at almost
every t is described as follows: take any large integer z(> γmax). each ﬁrm
makes its k-th product renewal at the same time zk and β takes up the high
position at the ﬁrst product renewal, i.e.,
tk := tk(s
∗
α) = tk(s
∗
β) = z
k for any k ≥ 1, and xβ(t1) > xα(t1).
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Consider α’s deviation. Let t(s′α) be the time at which β ﬁrst observes α’s
deviation. Since a(·) < ∞ and limt→∞ λt = 0, we can take a large integer kˆ
such that
xβ(tkˆ(s
∗
β))− xα(tkˆ(s∗α)) < a(γmax).
Firm α can take up the high position at t = t(s′α) by its deviation to σ
′
α,
when it makes its kˆ-th product renewal.
By the deﬁnition of γmax and its uniqueness, consumers do not highly
value product renewal made at any intervals that exceed or fall below γmax.
Hence, product renewal made at every interval γmax boosts the quality level
xβ(t) of β’s product most rapidly in the inﬁnite horizon of time. Thus, the
strongest retaliatory action that β can take against α’s deviation is renewing
its product at every interval γmax.
Hence, even if β starts to make the strongest retaliatory product renewal
at t(s′α) + 1 against α’s deviation to σ
′
α, α can take up the high position
at least one time at every interval γmax because both ﬁrms thereafter renew
their products at the same interval γmax. This contradicts the existence of
σ∗ with µα(σ∗) = 0. The same argument applies to the other cases where α
and β have diﬀerent integers zα and zβ, if we take diﬀerent times kˆ and kˆ
′
suﬃciently large so that 0 < xβ(tkˆ′(s
∗
β))− xα(tkˆ(s∗α)) < a(γmax). 
The next proposition shows how duopolists behave in this dynamic game
in more detail.
Proposition. 2 The following results hold under Assumption (a).
(i) The basic model has equilibria in pure strategies. (ii) In any equilibrium
σ∗ in pure strategies, there is the time t∗(< ∞) after which each ﬁrm renews
its product asynchronously with the other at the same interval γmax. (iii)
A turnover takes place whenever each ﬁrm renews its product after t∗ (i.e.,
together with (ii), a turnover cycle is generated).
Proof We will begin with (ii). The proof of (i) is shown after that in such a
way that the strategies depicted in (ii) constitute equilibria in pure strategies.
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Figure 1: Asynchronous periodic product renewal is made after t∗ (γmax = 2).
(ii) Suppose that there is an equilibrium σ∗ in pure strategies and that in the
σ∗ only ﬁrm β renews its product at interval γmax ﬁnitely many times (i.e.,
at most ﬁnite times ﬁrm α does not renew its product at the interval γmax.),
w.o.l.g. Let {τl}∞l=1 = {τ1, τ2, . . . } be an inﬁnite sequence of intervals at each
of which ﬁrm β renews its product, where τl = γmax at most ﬁnitely many
times. Consider ﬁrst the case of xβ(0) > xα(0). Since |xα(0) − xβ(0)| < ∞,
we can take a positive integer nˆ such that if ﬁrm α renews its product at
every interval γmax, then
nˆ[a(γmax)− sup
L:1<L≤nˆγmax
sup
{τl}Ll=1:
 L
l=1 τl≤nˆγmax
{∑L−1l=1 λτl+1+···+τLa(τl) + a(τL)}]
> |xα(0)− xβ(0)|.
The left-hand side is positive by Eq. (1). Note that the above inequality
guarantees that for any initial quality diﬀerence xβ(0) − xα(0)(> 0), α can
overtake the rival β in terms of quality level within a ﬁnite time nˆγmax. Let tˆ
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be the earliest time by which ﬁrm α has renewed its product nˆ times at the
interval γmax. Clearly, we have tˆ < ∞ for any |xα(0)− xβ(0)|.
If ﬁrm α renews its product at every interval γmax until tˆ, it takes up
ﬁrm β’s position by the time tˆ. Moreover, ﬁrm α will be in the high position
almost any time after tˆ because at most ﬁnite times it does not renew its
product at the interval γmax according to {s∗α(t)}∞t=tˆ+1. The additional costs
that α must pay until taking up β’s position are at most tˆC. Since tˆ < ∞, the
additional long-run average cost is zero, i.e., lim infn→∞(tˆC/n) = 0. Hence,
µβ(σ
∗) = 0, contradicting Lemma 1. The same argument (after tˆ) applies to
the case of xα(0) ≥ xβ(0).
There is no equilibrium in which both ﬁrms do not renew their products
at the interval γmax inﬁnitely many times. This is true because ﬁrm i can
be in the high position at almost every time and can gain more (due to
Assumption (a)) by renewing its product at every interval γmax, provided
that the other ﬁrm does not renew its product at the interval γmax inﬁnitely
many times.
Suppose that both ﬁrms renew their products synchronously after t∗ in
equilibrium. Since they renew their products at the same interval γmax as
shown in Proposition 2 (ii), the ﬁrm in the low position at t∗ can never take
up the high position after t∗, i.e., µi(σ∗) = 0, contradicting Lemma 1. 
(iii) Suppose that there is a time t(≥ t∗) at which a turnover does not take
place even though either ﬁrm i renews its product. Since both ﬁrms make
their product renewal at the same interval γmax after t
∗ by Proposition 2
(ii), the ﬁrm i can never take up the high position, so it has µi(σ
∗) = 0,
contradicting Lemma 1. 
(i) Assumption (a) is equivalent to
1
γmax
πH +
γmax − 1
γmax
πL − C
γmax
≥ πL.
If an equilibrium in such pure strategies that are speciﬁed in Proposition 2
(ii) exists, each ﬁrm obtains πH at least one time at every interval γmax by
(iii), spending C/γmax on average in the limit. When a ﬁrm deviates to any
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other strategies that require the ﬁrm not to renew its product at the interval
γmax inﬁnitely many times, it obtains at most πL on average in the limit. The
above inequality hence implies that there is no incentive for ﬁrms to deviate
from the pure strategies described in Proposition 2 (ii). 
As shown in Proposition 2, the stationary product renewal will begin after
the time t∗ comes. It would be more interesting if we could have derived what
happens before that stationarity is attained. Unfortunately, “anything goes”
before t∗ in any equilibrium. This is true because the sums of short-run
proﬁts ﬁrms have gained until t∗ converge to zero as n tends to inﬁnity by
the use of the limit of means criterion. In real practices, we can observe
simultaneous product renewal. In our model, it would be possible in the
process where the ﬁrm in the low-position catches up with the ﬁrm in the
high position before t∗ comes.
3. The Extended Model
We hereafter incorporate price decision into the model. In the extended
model, the following example works as a typical underlying market structure.
3.1 An example: vertical product diﬀerentiation
Consider a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on (0, 1), each
indexed by λ with demand for one unit of product from either ﬁrm α or β.
Each ﬁrm produces its product at the cost c per unit of output and does
not make its product renewal at this time t. A consumer λ has her utility
function u(t) = λx(t − 1)− p(t), where λ is her depreciation rate to quality
level x(t−1) ∈ {xα(t−1), xβ(t−1)} of a commodity, and p(t) ∈ {pα(t), pβ(t)}
is the price she actually pays for the commodity of quality λx(t − 1). Let
x(t − 1) := xβ(t − 1) − xα(t − 1) > 0. Assume that 0 < pβ(t) − pα(t) <
x(t− 1). Firms compete in prices.
The consumer who is indiﬀerent to whether to buy α’s good or β’s is at
θ0 = (pβ(t) − pα(t))/(xβ(t − 1) − xα(t − 1)). The demand for β’s good is
1 − θ0 and that for α’s is θ0, so the short-run proﬁt of ﬁrm β at time t is
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(pβ(t)− c)(1− θ0) and that of ﬁrm α is (pα(t)− c)θ0. Hence, the equilibrium
price is hence
p∗β(t) = c + (2/3)x(t− 1) and p∗α(t) = c + (1/3)x(t− 1). (6)
In the equilibrium, β obtains πH(t) and α obtains πL(t), where
πH(t) = (5/6)
2x(t− 1) and πL(t) = (1/6)2x(t− 1). (7)
As consumers value ﬁrm α’s product less, the demand for it may decrease.
However, as the product diﬀerentiation is larger, ﬁrm β can sell its product
at a higher price. Hence, ﬁrm α can also sell its product at a higher price
p∗β(t), as x(t− 1) becomes larger. Note that p∗β(t) and p∗α(t) are increasing
in x(t) = λx(t− 1).
In the dynamic price competition with product renewal, we may generate
not only a turnover cycle but also a “price-quality cycle.”9 However, this
paper aims to show a turnover cycle in a simple model, so we exclude any
possibility of generating complicated cycles by introducing the consumers’
tolerance of the delay in product renewal as noted in the Introduction.
3.2 Consumers’ tolerance
Let us extend the basic model. The example shown in the subsection
3.1 is a typical underlying market structure in our extended model. We will
modify Eq. (2) and its related parts in the following way.
Let ﬁrm i be in the high position at time t. For any k(≥ 1) and for
any t with tk−1(si) ≤ t < tk(si), if ﬁrm i has renewed its product within an
interval m(> 1), consumers buy ﬁrm i’s latest product at the ﬁxed quality
level yi(t) = xi(tk−1(si)) due to their brand loyalty. Once ﬁrm i has not
renewed its product within the interval m (condition A), consumers buy the
product at the real quality level yi(t) = xi(t) and punish the ﬁrm. At each
9Gale and Rosenthal (1994) studied the price-quality cycle, introducing consumers’
cognitive delay of product quality. Their analysis was also conﬁned to monopoly.
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time ﬁrm i suﬀers the damage d as additional costs from the punishment as
long as the ﬁrm is in the high position.
Given a history h(s, t) and a pair s(t) = (sα(t), sβ(t)) of actions, ﬁrm i
in the high position at time t− 1 earns its (gross) short-run proﬁt at time t
due to the latest and old products
πti(s(t) : h(t)) =
{
π˜H(t)− d · I(A) if yi(t) ≥ xj(t)
π˜L(t) if yi(t) < xj(t),
where ﬁrm j is in the low position at time t−1, I(A) assigns 1 if a condition
A is met or 0 otherwise, and d represents the damage ﬁrm i suﬀers if A is
met and satisﬁes π˜H(t)− π˜L(t) > d > 0 at any time t. Let
π˜H(t) = πH(x(t)) and π˜L(t) = πL(x(t)),
where x(t) := |yi(t) − xj(t)|. Assume that there is a real number bu ∈
(|xα(0) − xβ(0)| + a(γmax),∞) such that x(t) ≤ bu for any t. Hence, a(·)
is constrained when the quality diﬀerence x(·) is near the upper limit bu.
We need no speciﬁcation of that constraint to show the remaining results.
Each ﬁrm maximizes its short-run proﬁt at each time t given the quality
diﬀerence x(t). Assume the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
prices at each time t. Denote by p˜∗H(t) (p˜
∗
L(t)) the equilibrium price at time
t for the high-(low-) quality product. Assume that p˜∗H(t) > p˜
∗
L(t) and that
they are both increasing in x(t) at any t as in Eq. (6). As in Eq. (7),
π˜H(t) and π˜L(t) are both increasing in x(t) at any t.
On the other hand, ﬁrm j in the low position at time t−1 earns its (gross)
short-run proﬁt at time t due to the latest and old products
πtj(s(t) : h(t)) =
{
π˜H(t) if xj(t) > yi(t)
π˜L(t) if xj(t) ≤ yi(t).
We conﬁne our attention to the case where yi(t) is monotonically nondecreas-
ing in t if ﬁrm i in the high position renews its product at every interval m,
i.e., for any k(≥ 1),
yi(tk(si)) = λ
mxi(tk−1(si)) + a(m) ≥ xi(tk−1(si)) = yi(tk−1(si)). (8)
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By Eq. (8), the interval m reﬂects consumers’ “ratchet” on the quality
level of the product. Let γmax < m. Since γmax is the most desirable in-
terval for product renewal from the consumers’ viewpoint, we call m− γmax
consumers’ ”tolerance” level to the delay in product renewal.
In what follows, Assumption (a’) on the amount of C guarantees that
the ﬁrm in the high position obtains more proﬁt than the ﬁrm in the low
position. We need Assumption (b) on d.
Assumption (a’) π˜H()− π˜L(bu) ≥ C(> 0) for any  ∈ (0, bu). (b) C < d.
Proposition. 3 The following results hold under Assumptions (a’) and (b).
(i) The extended model has equilibria in pure strategies. (ii) In any equilib-
rium σ∗ in pure strategies of the extended model, if m− γmax is so large that
λm|xα(0)−xβ(0)| < a(γmax), then there is the time t∗(< ∞) after which each
ﬁrm renews its product asynchronously with the other at the same interval
γmax and a turnover cycle is generated. Otherwise, only a ﬁrm producing a
high-quality product makes its product renewal, and the interval is m.
Proof : See the Appendix.
In Fig. 2, simultaneous product renewal could have appeared in the
process where the ﬁrm in the low position catches up with the ﬁrm in the
high position before t∗ arrives. As in Fig. 2 and 3, we hereafter say that
consumers are “tolerant” of product renewal if λm|xα(0)− xβ(0)| < a(γmax),
and that they are “fussy” about it otherwise. Fig2 (Fig. 3) illustrates the
typical equilibrium paths of quality levels in the tolerant (fussy) case.
The equilibrium paths of the quality-adjusted prices (QAPs) clarify the
implications of Proposition 3 (ii) for consumers’ welfare. Deﬁne the QAPH
(QAPL) of a high-(low-)quality product as
QAPH(t) =
p(t)
y(t)
and QAPL(t) =
p(t)
x(t)
.
Hence, consumer welfare improves as the QAPs decease.
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xi(0)
xβ(0)
xα(0)
0 t
a(γmax)
γmax
t*
turnover cycle
Figure 2: Typical equilibrium paths of quality levels. A turnover cycle appears
after t∗ if consumers are tolerant of the delay in product renewal.
xi(0)
xβ(0)
xα(0)
0 t
m
Figure 3: Typical equilibrium paths of quality levels. The quality level of a low-
quality product goes down over time if consumers are fussy about product renewal.
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Claim. 1 (1) In the tolerant case, the QAPs of both ﬁrms’ products tend
to decrease and the rates of their decrease taper oﬀ. (2) In the fussy case,
the QAPs of a high-quality product never decrease so much as those in the
tolerant case. Rather, they may increase and the QAPs of a low-quality
product never decrease.
In the tolerant case (Fig. 2), the quality diﬀerence x(t) varies cyclically
within a range (< a(γmax)) due to a severe competition after t
∗, whereas
before t∗ it tends to decrease to the restricted range. As is seen in the
example, the equilibrium prices (p∗α(t), p
∗
β(t)) at time t increase in x(t),
so the equilibrium prices both evolve synchronously with x(t) in the same
direction. The quality levels tend to improve over time, so the QAPs of both
products tend to decrease and the rates of their decrease taper oﬀ.
Conversely, in the fussy case (Fig. 3), the equilibrium prices of a high-
quality product increase as the quality diﬀerence becomes larger, while it is
renewed at the longest interval m that consumers can tolerate. As a result,
the QAPs of a high-quality product may increase, and they never decrease as
much as those in the case of tolerant consumers, even though they decrease.
The QAPs of a low-quality product never decrease because its equilibrium
prices can increase even though the low-quality product is not renewed, and
the quality goes down to the minimum level.
In Fig. 5, the QAPs of ﬁrm α goes up over time, but it will be ﬂat after
a time t′ with x(t′) = b. In reality, consumers would stop purchasing a
product sooner or later, if its QAPs continued to increase over time.
Note that the quality diﬀerence x(t∗) is determined by an equilibrium
σ∗ but that t∗ is not completely determined. For a clearer result on t∗,
we consider a stronger (but ad hoc) equilibrium notion. We say that a list
σ∗∗ := (σ∗∗α , σ
∗∗
β ) of strategies is an equilibrium with pre-t
∗ preference if (a)
it is an equilibrium with the earliest t∗ and (b) for each i ∈ {α, β},
∑t∗
t=1{πti(s∗∗(t) : h(s∗∗, t))− s∗∗i (t)C}
≥∑t∗t=1{πti((s∗i (t), s∗∗j (t), ) : h((s∗i , s∗∗j , t))− s∗i (t)C} for any s∗i ∈ Σi.
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0 t
QAP
α
β
Figure 4: The QAPs of products decrease over time and the rates of decrease
taper oﬀ if consumers are tolerant of the delay for product renewal.
0 t
QAP
α
β
Figure 5: The QAPs of a low-quality product goes up over time if consumers are
fussy about product renewal.
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The requirement (b) means that, given a time t∗, each ﬁrm takes actions in
σ∗ such that the ﬁrm maximizes the sum of short-run proﬁt until t∗.
xβ(0)
xα(0)
xi(0)
m1
m2
t*2 t
*
1 t0
Figure 6: A comparative statics: t∗ becomes smaller as m becomes larger.
Claim. 2 Suppose that consumers are so tolerant of the delay in product
renewal that λm|xα(0) − xβ(0)| < a(γmax). Let m + 1 < t∗. Then, in any
equilibrium σ∗∗ with pre-t∗ preference of the extended model, t∗ does not be-
come larger as consumers’ tolerance level m − γmax becomes larger. When
the increment in m is so large that λmxi(tk−1(si)) + a(m) > xi(tk−1(si)) for
any k ≥ 1, t∗ becomes smaller as m becomes larger.
Proof : See the Appendix.
Fig. 6 illustrates the latter part of Claim 2.10 Claim 2 gives another
implication for consumers’ welfare in the duopoly case we have analyzed. In
the monopoly case traditionally analyzed in the literature, it is easy to see
10Fig. 6 also suggests that the larger xα(0) − xβ(0) is, the smaller t∗ should become
under the same conditions.
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that consumers can maximize their welfare by never being tolerant, i.e., m =
γmax. The diﬀerence of these implications comes from the market competition
in quality levels by duopolists.
4. Remarks
In real practices, we can ﬁnd the types of periodic product renewal that we
derived from the models. In the Japanese automobile industry, for instance,
full-model changes are made almost every 4 or 5 years. Table 1 shows the
history of full-model changes for the mid-class compact sedans for the three
major companies: Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Corona versus Bluebird and
Carolla versus Sunny had been well-known rivals until mid-90’s. Simultane-
ous model changes are not found except Bluebird and Civic (1991.9).
Table 1: Full-model changes for compact Japanese cars from 1985 to 2006.
car name date
Toyota Corona 1987.12 1992.2 1995.12 —— (2001.12)
Nissan Bluebird 1987.9 1991.9 —— 1996.1 (2001.8)
Toyota Carolla 1987.5 1991.6 1995.5 —— 2000.8 2006.10
Nissan Sunny 1985.9 1990.1 1994.1 —— —— (2004.9)
Toyota Camry 1986.8 1990.7 1994.7 —— 2001.9 2006.1
Nissan Skyline 1985.8 1989.5 1993.8 1998.5 2001.6 2006.11
Honda Civic 1987.9 1991.9 1995.9 —— 2000.9 ——
Honda Accord 1985.6 1989.9 1993.5 1997.9 2002.10 ——
Note: The brackets indicate the year and month when the production of a car was ceased.
Data Source: Yahoo Japan, 2006.12, http:autos.yahoo.co.jp/ncar
There are two measures of price changes with quality changes, hedonic
price index (Griliches (1961)) and QAP index (Trajtenberg (1990)).11 As
11The hedonic price index is constructed by regressing price on product characteristics
and time dummies. It is based on the coeﬃcients of time dummies. Pakes (2003) suggests
an alternative method. The QAP index is computed by estimating a consumer utility
function. It is based on the compensating or equivalent variation.
20
the essence of these indices, we deﬁned the QAP as the price paid by con-
sumers divided by the quality level of the product. Using this deﬁnition,
Fishman and Rob (2002) explained the following empirical regularities from
the viewpoint of a monopolist’s investment in R&D: QAPs of products de-
crease over time and the rates of decrease taper oﬀ (see Griliches (1961)
for automobiles, Berndt and Griliches (1993) for minicomputers and Gandal
(1994) for software packages.). We could give another explanation to the
empirical regularities from another viewpoint of duopolists’ competition.12
This paper did not consider the ﬁrms’ investment decisions on R&D for
new products. We can obtain the same results if the decision is made on the
basis of 0-1 (no investment or some investment). It suﬃces to modify the
acceleration a(τ) in such a way that consumers can observe the investment
decision made at each time and τ is the cumulative investments made after
the latest product renewal. In an inﬁnite-horizon model, Fishman and Rob
(2000) studied planned obsolescence with more general R&D investment,
although their consideration was limited to monopoly.13
Finally, we can apply our results to the case of n ﬁrms, if γmax ≥ n.
When γmax < n, some ﬁrms will renew their products simultaneously even
after the time t∗. In this case, we need to consider price cartel formation
by those ﬁrms. More interesting is whether or not we can derive coalition
formation among ﬁrms and its development before time t∗. The history of
the Japanese automobile industry tells us of a rivalry between Toyota and
Nissan and a high rate of parts supplier sharing between Toyota and some
other automakers except Nissan. The dynamics of that cartel formation
should be a subject of a future research.
12Our model can be used to estimate some parameters of consumers’ attributes (e.g., λ,
m and γmax) from the curvature of a QAP curve for a given industry.
13Waldman (1996) also considered monopolist’s R&D investments in a two-period
model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We can describe any strategies of any ﬁrm i ∈
{α, β} as a real number between 0.00 and 1.11 · · · . Consider a strategy
σ′ ∈ Σi corresponding to 1.0 · · ·010 · · · where 1’s appear after γmax(> 1) con-
secutive 0’s. We can ﬁnd a real number r := 1.1 · · ·10 · · · with ﬁnitely many
consecutive 1’s such that strategies corresponding to any numbers greater
than r are dominated by σ′. This is true because σ′ induces the fastest
growth of xi(t) by Eq. (1) and its marketing expenditure spent for product
renewal at the early times disappears in the limit by the deﬁnition in Eq. (3)
of the long-run average net proﬁt. Hence, it suﬃces to consider [0, r]. Let
i be a set of ﬁrm i’s mixed strategies deﬁned on [0, r]. For any i ∈ {α, β},
i is compact and convex and Πi is continuous on i. Hence, the existence
of equilibria in mixed strategies is guaranteed. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (ii) Here we only show that Eq. (4) (described in
Lemma 1) holds true also in the extended model under Assumptions (a’) and
(b) if λm(xβ(0) − xα(0)) < a(γmax) because the remaining part of the proof
is completely the same as the proof of Proposition 2 (ii). Eq. (4) is repeated
below.
µi(σ
∗) := lim inf
n→∞
|{t ≤ n : x∗i (t) > x∗j(t)}|
n
> 0, i = α, β.
Suppose that there is an equilibrium σ∗ with µα(σ∗) = 0 and xβ(0) >
xα(0), w.l.o.g. Then, in that equilibrium,
Πα(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
t=1 π˜L(t)− s∗α(t)C
n
,
Πβ(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
n→∞
∑n
t=1{π˜H(t)− d · I(A)− s∗β(t)C}
n
. (9)
Even once ﬁrm β has not renewed its product in the interval m until a time
t′, consumers punish the ﬁrm β forever and β suﬀers the damage d at every
time after t′ from the punishment. Then, ﬁrm β can obtain no more than
lim infn→∞
∑n
t=1 π˜H(t)/n−d in the long-run. Let σ′β denote a strategy of ﬁrm
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β such that for any k and for any t, s′β(t) = 1 if t−tk−1(s′β) = m and s′β(t) = 0
otherwise. By using σ′β, ﬁrm β obtains Πβ(σ
∗
α, σ
′
β) = lim infn→∞
∑n
t=1 π˜H(t)−
C/m in the long run. If β renews its product ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely many
times before the interval m passes, β must pay some amount of average cost
lim infn→∞
∑n
t=0 s
∗
i (t)C/n in the long run, which is no less than C/m. Hence,
it cannot obtain more than Πβ(σ
∗
α, σ
′
β). Thus, σ
∗
β = σ
′
β.
For any k and for any t ∈ [tk−1(sβ), tk(sβ)), x(t) = |yβ(t) − xα(t)|,
where yβ(t) = xβ(tk−1(sβ)). Given σ∗β = σ
′
β, yβ(t) is nondecreasing in t
by Eq. (8). Then, if ﬁrm α chooses sα(t) = 0 at time t, xα(t) decreases
due to consumers’ depreciation and x(t) increases if x(t) < bu. Even if
x(t) = bu, α’s choice of sα(t) = 1 does not enlarge x(t). Since π˜L(t) is
increasing inx(t), α will choose s∗α(t) = 0 at almost every time t in order to
maximize Πα(σα, σ
∗
β). Thus, α obtains Πα(σ
∗
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
∞
n=1
∑n
t=1 π˜L(t)/n.
Consider the case where α deviates to a strategy σ′α such that sα(t) = 1
only if t − tk−1(sα) = γmax for any k(≥ 1). Since β takes sβ(t) = 1 only if
t − tk−1(s∗β) = m for any k(≥ 1), there is a time n′ such that α overtakes
β at n′ and is in the high position at almost any time after n′. Then, α
obtains Πα(σ
′
α, σ
∗
β) = lim inf
∞
n=1
∑n
t=1 π˜H(t)/n− C/γmax. It is easy to see by
Assumption (a’) that π˜H(t) − C/γmax > π˜L(t) for any t and so α has an
incentive to deviate to a strategy σ′α.
When λm(xβ(0) − xα(0)) < a(γmax), if ﬁrm α deviates to σ′α at a time
t = m + γmax, α can then take up the high position. As noted in the proof
of Lemma 1, product renewal made at every interval γmax boosts the quality
level xβ(t) most rapidly over time. Thus, this is the strongest retaliatory
action β can take against α’s deviation. Hence, if α deviates to σ′α at t =
m + γmax, α can take up the high position at least one time within every
interval γmax, even when β starts to take the strongest retaliatory action at
t ≥ m + γmax + 1. This contradicts the existence of σ∗ with µα(σ∗) = 0.
When λm(xβ(0)−xα(0)) ≥ a(γmax), ﬁrm α cannot overtake ﬁrm β even once
if β takes the strongest retaliatory action against α’s deviation to σ′α. 
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(i) Note that π˜L(b
u) ≥ π˜L() for any  ∈ (0, a(γmax)) because bu is the upper
bound of x(·) and π˜L(t) increases in x(t) at each t. By Assumption (a’),
we have π˜H()− π˜L() ≥ C for any  ∈ (0, a(γmax)), which is equivalent to
1
γmax
π˜H() +
γmax − 1
γmax
π˜L()− C
γmax
≥ π˜L(bu)
for any  ∈ (0, a(γmax)). If an equilibrium in such pure strategies that are
speciﬁed in Proposition 3 (ii) exists, each ﬁrm obtains at least π˜H() at least
one time within every interval γmax by (ii), spending marketing expenditure
C/γmax on average in the limit. When either ﬁrm i deviates to any other
strategies that require the ﬁrm not to renew its product at the interval γmax
inﬁnitely many times, ﬁrm i obtains at most π˜L(b
u) on average in the limit
because the rival ﬁrm j makes its product renewal at every interval γmax and
because ﬁrm i can enlargex(t) without paying cost C by choosing si(t) = 0
always. Hence, pure strategies described in the proof of Proposition 3 (ii)
constitute an equilibrium σ∗. 
Proof of Claim 2 We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma. 2 Let m+ 1 < t∗. In any equilibrium σ∗∗ with pre-t∗ preference of
the extended model, the ﬁrm in the high position renews its product at every
interval m (γmax) until t
∗ if it will not be overtaken by the other ﬁrm by doing
so, and the ﬁrm in the low position renews its product at every interval γmax
until t∗
Proof By the requirement (a) for σ∗∗, t∗ should be the time at which the ﬁrst
turnover takes place. Fix such a time t∗. Then, the ﬁrm in the high position
will renew its product in the interval m until t∗ because the overdelay in
product renewal gives the damage d to the ﬁrm at each time. This violates
the requirement (b) for σ∗∗, because C < d by Assumption (b).
Consider the case where ﬁrm i (j) with xi(0) > xj(0) renews its product
at every interval m (γmax) until t
∗. Even if ﬁrm i (j) makes its product
renewal before the interval m passes (after the interval γmax passes by), time
t∗ for the ﬁrst turnover will never be earlier because x(t) is enlarged by
such a product renewal. This completes the proof. 
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By using Lemma 2, we can see that t∗ does not become larger when m
becomes m′(> m), if ﬁrm j in the low position keeps the initial σ∗∗j intact.
Assumption (a’) is a suﬃcient condition for ﬁrm j not to delay its product
renewal. Hence, ﬁrm j renews its product at every interval γmax. Fig. 6
illustrates the proof of the latter part of the Claim, where ﬁrm β is in the
high position at t = 0. It is easy to see that if λmxi(tk−1(si)) + a(m) = xi(0)
for any k ≥ 1, we have t∗1 = t∗2. If m2 −m1 is not so large, again t∗1 = t∗2. 
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